

STATINTL

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the U. S. plane shot down May 1 in Soviet Armenia. The Defense Ministry newspaper also gave some details of the incident ~~and~~ but made no mention of the pilot. RED STAR gave this account. An anti-aircraft defense unit was alerted by an alarm signal just at ~~the~~ dawn on May 1. When radio operators received the first reports about the course of an unknown plane which had entered Soviet territory from the South it became increasingly clear with every passing minute that the plane was an alien machine and that its intentions were hostile. The plane was flying at a very great altitude and at a speed of approximately 540 miles per hour. The engagement was brief and it was soon learned that the intruder was brought down. The population of nearby villages helped to locate the wreckage quickly.

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

May 10, 1960

UPI-209

(RED PLANES)

Chicago -- The Illinois Director of Civil Defense said today it is very likely that Russian "spying" planes have flown over Chicago.

Maj. Gen. Robert M. Woodward said "Russian planes have the capacity to reach virtually any part of the United States."

"We know there have been instances when Strategic Air Command planes have flown over Defense Command bases without detection," Woodward said, "so, if the detection devices missed our own planes, aren't the chances the same for the Russians?"

5/10 - N917P

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

10 May 1960

UPI-237

(PLANES)

COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO -- A North American Air Defense Command spokesman said today the organization has "no knowledge or record" of any flights over the continental United States or Alaska by a Russian Spy plane.

The spokesman said, however, NORAD radar scopes "constantly pick up Russian planes flying in the Bering Straits Area. Occasionally while turning, the planes will fly over our territory."

"But", he added, "we do not consider this a hostile act. These planes, while flying patrol or on training missions, sometimes come over our territory because of bad weather drift."

He said NORAD took "bitter exception" to remarks by "Donrad Adenauer and other Europeans (that) such planes have been over the United States.

"Our radar is effective beyond any known operational range of any Soviet bombers," he added.

5/10 - N1135P

UPI-209

(RED PLANES)

CHICAGO--THE ILLINOIS DIRECTOR OF CIVIL DEFENSE SAID TODAY IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT RUSSIAN "SPYING" PLANES HAVE FLOWN OVER CHICAGO.

MAJ. GEN..ROBERT M. WOODWARD SAID "RUSSIAN PLANES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ANY PART OF THE UNITED STATES."

"WE KNOW TH-ERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHEN STRATGIC AIR COMMAND PLANES HAVE FLOWN OVER DEFENSE COMMAND BASES WITHOUT DETECTION," WOODWARD SAID, "SO, IF THE DETECTION DEVICES MISSED OUR OWN PLANES, AREN'T THE CHANCES THE SAME FOR THE RUSSIANS?"

5/10--N917P

UPI-237

(PLANES)

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THE SPOKESMAN SAID, HOWEVER, NORAD RADAR SCOPES "CONSTANTLY PICK UP RUSSIAN PLANES FLYING IN THE BERING STRAITS AREA. OCCASIONALLY WHILE TURNING, THE PLANES WILL FLY OVER OUR TERRITORY."

"BUT," HE ADDED, "WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS A HOSTILE ACT. THESE PLANES, WHILE FLYING PATROL OR ON TRAINING MISSIONS, SOMETIMES COME OVER OUR TERRITORY BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER DRIFT."

HE SAID NORAD TOOK "BITTER EXCEPTION" TO REMARKS BY "DONRAD ADENAUER AND OTHER EUROPEANS (THAT) SUCH PLANES HAVE BEEN OVER THE UNITED STATES.

"OUR RADAR IS EFFECTIVE BEYOND ANY KNOWN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF ANY SOVIET BOMBERS," HE ADDED.

5/10--N1135P

V. P. RICHARD NIXON INTERVIEWED

Open End with David Susskind at 10:00 P.M. over WNTA-TV
(Newark, N. J.):

Guest: Vice President Richard Nixon

THE SCREEN SHOWED V. P. RICHARD NIXON
AND DAVID SUSSKIND SEATED IN THE STUDIO.

SUSSKIND: "I wondered if we might begin tonight by the issue that's on everybody's tongue and mind these days, the issue of the U-2 plane and aerial reconnaissance. There are aspects of that situation that deeply trouble many people in the country. Your presence gives us the chance to explore the problem a bit.

"One of the things that comes to my mind about that incident is the connotation of the incident, that it had -- that there was, in our government, a lack of coordinated planning and intelligence in the sense that this situation persevered at an exquisitely bad time, on the very eve of the summit conference. It would seem to indicate a lack of cohesion and planning within our government. Would you comment on that, sir?"

NIXON: "Well, let me say that the incident is one which, as you say, has caused a great concern among many observers of the international scene, and of our own policy. I think that if we examine first, what was done, and then, what was said about what was done, that we can perhaps break the question into its proper aspects.

"Now, as far as what was done was concerned, the President of the United States ordering that a program be set up for conducting aerial reconnaissance

of the Soviet Union, a potential attacker of the United States and of the free world, I think most people have agreed that the President was justified in setting up such a program. Justified because we will recall that in 1955, the President at the Geneva Conference submitted his 'Open Skies' proposal to Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin, and that proposal was made for the purpose of protecting both the Soviet Union, the United States, and all other nations for that matter, from surprise attack.

"The Soviet Union has refused since that time to enter into any agreement whereby such flights as the U-2 made would be reciprocal. The President, therefore, felt that it was necessary for him, in order to obtain information which would alert the United States and the free world against any preparations for a surprise attack, to institute this program. And so these flights of reconnaissance planes, to which the President and Secretary of State Herter referred, have taken place.

"Now, let's go to the matter of the timing of the flight because you've raised that question, and I think very properly. People say, first, that they agree -- those who -- I don't mean that all agree even that we should have entered into this kind of a program at all, but I think the majority of the people would recognize the necessity for us to protect ourselves against surprise attack and this was the only way that we could get this kind of information.

"We in the United States, for example, present an altogether different problem to the Soviet Union. They do not have to engage in this kind of activity because we are an open society. This is the problem which is posed, of course, by a closed society."

SUSSKIND: "I think that, probably, sir, very little equivocation about our having this kind of program under these circumstances. It is the other

aspects -- the timing."

NIXON: "The timing -- well, let me talk about the timing a moment."

SUSSKIND: "Is it a goof, sir?"

NIXON: "No, it was not a goof. Let me say this. First of all, put yourself in the position of the President and of those who have responsibility for this program. The responsibility is a great one. The responsibility is to, one, get information and two, to be sure there is no gap in that information. We can no more afford, might I say, an intelligence gap, than we can afford a deterrent gap."

SUSSKIND: "Could we have afforded a two week gap here?"

NIXON: "Well, that ..."

SUSSKIND: "To make it comfortable for our President to arrive at the summit under the best possible circumstances?"

NIXON: "Let me put it this way again. As far as this particular incident was concerned, the flight occurred approximately three weeks before the summit conference. Now people say, 'Why didn't we have a recess at that period?' And my answer is this: 'When is the right time to make a flight?' Let's go back over the last year.

"Although it was not as important as the summit conference, certainly not nearly as important, some might have said, 'Well, you shouldn't have a flight like this at a time that the Vice President is visiting the Soviet Union.' I am sure that many would have said, 'Well, don't risk a flight like this at a time that Mr. Khrushchev is coming to the United States.' I am sure ..."

SUSSKIND: "Do you agree with that?"

NIXON: "No, I would not. I am sure that many others -- if I can continue I'll tell you why. I am sure that many others would say 'We shouldn't have

flights like this at a time that the President is visiting the uncommitted countries of Southeast Asia,' and others would say 'We shouldn't have flights like this at a time when the President is visiting the countries of South America,' and I am sure that people would say 'We shouldn't have flights like this and run any risk at a time that the President is visiting the Soviet Union.'

"The point I am trying to make is this: there is never a right time to make one of these flights if you're going to get caught.

"Now, there is never a right time, in other words, that you can select because we have to have a continuing program -- a continuing program, having in mind that -- the problem with which we are confronted. And so while I think a case can be made by the critics to the effect that these flights should have been discontinued, say one month before, the question is one month, two months, three, where do you draw the line?"

SUSSKIND: "Where overwhelming logic and diplomatic necessity would seem to indicate that a cessation might be in order for a limited period of time.

"I wonder about a second aspect of the flight, Mr. Nixon, and that has to do with the early response of our government that would seem to indicate that the decision on these flights, and particularly this flight, may have been a Pentagon decision, an Air Force decision or CIA decision, of which the President was not aware, and on which he was not fully posted.

"There were some early indications that the President was not cognizant of this particular flight, that later was backtracked on. Is the President, in your opinion -- knowledge -- fully conversant with this kind of intelligence operation and has he been over a sustained period of time?"

NIXON: "The answer is 'yes' to both questions."

SUSSKIND: "And I ask another thing, too. The early response of our government, where first we -- well, I suppose the only word is 'lied' -- and then we backtracked on the lie. Isn't this a damaging thing? I mean damaging to basic credibility of the American image around the world, to our allies and to the uncommitted countries?"

NIXON: "You know, strangely enough, I noted a columnist for the New York Times indicating the other day -- or at least suggesting -- that we made a basic mistake in admitting that we were involved in this kind of activity at all."

SUSSKIND: "That was Walter Lippman, I think."

NIXON: "And -- I think he's in the Herald Tribune. But be that as it may, it may have been Walter Lippman that I am referring to, but the point that I am making is this, that -- and this is a very key problem that you have raised -- it's the problem of what you do in an open society where you are engaged in activities like this, and you've got to do one of two things. One, you either ought to be silent or you ought to tell the truth. Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department were confronted when this information developed.

"They did not know that the pilot had been recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which made it imperative that we acknowledge that these flights had taken place. Now, some would say, 'Why, then, didn't we keep our mouths shut and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?'

"And here again we had the problem of the open society. We have newsmen in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other officials in great numbers, as they had a right to, and they asked for the information. 'What about this?' and so under those circumstances it was felt

that the best thing to do was to engage, in effect, in what is usually engaged in where so-called espionage activities are undertaken -- evasive action. Evasive action so as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive action so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, for example, an opportunity to accept the consequences of this flight without admitting, as he has had to admit, that it had been conducted for espionage purposes."

SUSSKIND: "I wonder, Mr. Nixon, though, if two fundamental questions don't underly the thing we're discussing right now. The first one is whether we can any longer, as a country that is the leader of the free world, whether we can any longer afford to equate the democratic process and the democratic way of life with confusion and stupidity?

"Some very reputable newspapermen of various political persuasions -- James Reston, Walter Lippman, The New York Times editorial section, have commented that this was a stupid piece of policy and a stupid piece of timing.

"Our answer to that, invariably, as a people and as a government, is that because it's a free society with the newspapermen descending upon you and so forth, that we are excusable on these counts because we are a democracy.

"Can we, in terms of the responsibility that sits on us so heavily and so inescapably, any longer afford to 'goof' in this way?"

NIXON: "Let me say this, that I do not agree with the critics who say we should have remained silent and that we should not have told the truth once it became inevitable that the Soviet Union -- Mr. Khrushchev -- knew what the truth was."

SUSSKIND: "May I ask two questions on that, sir?"

NIXON: "Yes, surely."

SUSSKIND: "Should we have lied, because that's what we did in the first instance?"

NIXON: "I think a grave question can be raised as to the advisability of the statements that were first made. On the other hand, may I just say in defense of those who have made those statements, Mr. Suskind, that I am not one to criticize them because I know the tremendous pressures under which they were operating. They had to make a snap decision at the moment, and it proved that -- it turned out that that decision was wrong. And in these kinds of activities we, of course, want to try to avoid mistakes if we can.

"History may record that this was a mistake. In my own opinion, speaking now of a policy generally, I would agree with you that we must maintain a posture of telling the truth when we do speak or of keeping silent."

SUSSKIND: "Well, why did we not, sir, fall back on that legendary and much revered tradition among nations of suggesting in a situation like this, of extreme national awkwardness, the response of, quote, 'we are investigating the situation,' which response is repeated periodically and finally nothing is ever said? This is the tradition of England and the tradition of France and all the great powers of yesteryear. Why did we find that not appealing for our purposes?"

NIXON: "Because we weren't dealing with the problems of yesteryear. We were dealing with the problems presented by Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, and he couldn't possibly let us get away with it. He had here, the pilot; he had the wreckage of the plane; he knew what was going on. And under the circumstances, had we sat back and said we were investigating, Mr. Khrushchev would have made us the laughing stock of the world. I think under -- in the days of ^{we} diplomacy of the past when/were dealing with France and with England and with traditional diplomacy of the 19th century, this might have worked. I don't think it'll work today."

SUSSKIND: "We probably haven't emerged in this situation as the laughing stock of the world, but perhaps as the crying stock in the world. And I think that a lot of us are very troubled about not only this incident, but what it presages for other such situations in the future. The confusion of it, the lack of response to it, the fumbling and the -- I use the word lie. You question the wisdom, but whatever it be, we were deeply wanting, it seems to me.

"You would agree to that in our response, at least, in the intelligence and planning of our response."

NIXON: "I again say that I will decline to criticize those in the State Department who had to make this decision at the moment. In retrospect I think all of us being Monday morning quarterbacks might have found different ways to handle it better. But having had to make tough decisions myself, as I'm sure you have at times, I realize that it's easy when you are faced with difficult choices, to make the choice that a majority of people may criticize."

SUSSKIND: "You know, sir. I'm no sports fan. I have as little appetite for the Monday morning quarterback as you do, but I am desperately anxious to acquire excellent Sunday afternoon coaches. (Laughter). And I think that's what we need. I wonder who of you would comment about the astounding statement of Secretary Harter, lectured and endorsed by President Eisenhower, that it will hence forth be our avowed policy to fly over Soviet territory and using the territory of our allies as bases from which to launch and land such flights. Isn't this a stunning and dangerous development?"

NIXON: "Well, I think, perhaps, that we ought to qualify your assumption a bit. I don't think the Secretary said exactly that. I think you have implied that what the Secretary said was that we would launch these flights in the future from the bases of our allies. What he said was that we must continue to get information of this type, as I recall. Now, let me just say this ..."

' SUSSKIND: "He also said -- forgive me, sir -- he also said, I'm positive because I read it three times that he -- it would continue to be our policy to conduct such aerial reconnaissance flights."

NIXON: "Well now, without raising a question about it, because I will assume your recollection of the fact was correct, and it very well may be.

"Let me say that I think that the position Secretary Herter was describing is one that puts the spotlight, as it should be, on the cause for these flights in the first place, and that is the fact that the world has no protection from surprise attack today. And that is why at the conference in Paris which is beginning tomorrow, it is vitally important that the leaders of the summit put surprise attack at the top of the summit agenda. Put surprise attack there so we can get this protection and so that flights such as Mr. Herter has described and such as have been undertaken in the past, will not be necessary in the future.

"And may I say this, when you say should we continue to engage in activities that will protect the security of the United States and the answer is, we have to. But my answer also is that this is not going to be by our choice. My answer also is that President Eisenhower will, supported by Secretary Herter, make every possible effort to get the surprise attack talks off of the dead center in which they have been for the last five years.

"And I might just add one other thing. We, all of us, talk about the U-2. There's a very exciting plus out of it, I think, purely apart of the information that we obtained which was important, very important. The plus is this: You realize that this flight clearly demonstrated the feasibility of the open skies proposal of the President. This demonstrates that unarmed planes can take photographs without causing any damage, any harm at all to commercial aviation or the national security of the country over which the flights are made. And

so, it seems to me, that we should take these flights as an example of what can be done in the future.

"For example, this same type of plane, the plane that has so successfully flown over the Soviet Union, can be used to fly over the United States, over the whole world. And once we have an agreement of that type between nations, then the problem with which you are concerned, of the United States unilaterally having to take these steps, protect itself, they no longer exist."

SUSSKIND: "Perhaps there could be very little quarrel that for the intelligence purposes needed in this era of secrecy, such flights are necessary, but I wonder about the potentially explosive and critically dangerous implications of the stated avowed policy that such aerial reconnaissance flights will continue.

"For example, no one need tell you, Mr. Nixon, about Mr. Khrushchev. You have met him, you have talked with him, you have debated with him. We have issued him a frontal challenge before the world that we will continue such flights. Your own comments about Mr. Khrushchev as a political personality, and as a man, seem to suggest that he cannot afford to take that lying down or passively, that he will rip up a crescendo of anti-American resentment and feeling because we have stated, in the forum of the world, that we will continue to send our planes over his territory violating his sovereignty. Have we not prodded him with pinpricks that could only bring forth a gusher of anger, revenge and retaliation?"

NIXON: "There's a very simple reaction that Mr. Khrushchev can have under these circumstances and that is to break down this wall of secrecy which made this flight necessary in the first place. We constantly tend to berate ourselves for doing what is necessary to protect ourselves. We overlooked the fact that Mr. Khrushchev does not have to violate our air space because of his diplomats violate our ground space as you know, day after day, year after year.

"Now, under the circumstances, it seems to me, that again we have got to keep the spotlight on what is really the solution to this problem. Let's look at it the other way. Let's suppose that as a result of what has happened here, that we say, since this flight was discovered, the United States will now announce to Mr. Khrushchev, well, since this plane has been knocked down we're going to discontinue activities of this sort. Look at the position this puts the United States in."

SUSSKIND: "Do we have to announce anything, we send our apologies..."

NIXON: "Well then you're suggesting we discontinue the flights and not announce it."

SUSSKIND: "Yes, sir since you prod me, yes, sir. But I think when we hit him full in the face with an avowed stated policy that we will violate your sovereignty at will, and continuously..."

NIXON: "Maybe we're not so far apart then as I would think. My problem is this. The first responsibility of the President of the United States, as you and I think, you and I both agree, is to protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the devastation which would result from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these flights were

made in the first place. That is why an indication has been made that such activities may have to continue in the future. I think the point that you raise is the advisability of announcing that those flights be continued in the future.

"And I can only suggest that that announcement might serve this useful purpose of forcing this issue of open and closed society, forcing the issue of open skies into the forefront at the Summit conference. Because, let me say this. We can talk at the Summit conference about discontinuing atomic tests as we should talk about it; we can talk about programs for disarmament; we can talk about the problem of Berlin, but the overwhelming major problem confronting the world today, if we want to avoid a war which will destroy civilization itself, is the surprise-attack problem.

"And if as a result of this announcement, which you consider to be inept, it tends to bring this subject out for discussion, put in on the table there, so that President Eisenhower, Mr. Mac Millan, President De Gaulle, and Mr. Khrushchev can talk about it in its hard realities, I think a useful purpose could be served. We just can't continue to sweep under the rug this problem of what do you about surprise attack. For five years we've done nothing about it. It's time to do something about it."

SUSSKIND: "What about the potential of this statement blowing the Summit conference sky-high, creating an atmosphere there in which serious and peaceful and willing negotiation among the powers was rent asunder for the arrogance of our statement."

NIXON: "Let me say this, Mr. Suskind. I am as concerned, as I know you are, about this conference, and as all people who are—who want peace, peace with freedom, are concerned about it. We want it to succeed.

"But let me add, you mentioned, a moment ago, that I had talked to Mr. Khrushchev. Now I don't pretend to be an expert on him as I'm sure he may not be an expert on me despite his recent reference to my being the goat in the cabbage patch; but on the other hand, I would say this, that as I see Mr. Khrushchev, and as I know him, I don't believe that this incident is going in itself to tear the Summit Conference apart. Mr. Khrushchev is a realist. Mr. Khrushchev is a man who is not a babe in the woods when it comes to, shall we say, espionage activity. He is a man who, of course, makes the most out of the propaganda opportunity when it's presented to him. But I think at the Summit Conference that we can and should expect him to sit down and talk with the president and his two colleagues frankly and directly and that the chances for progress have not been substantially diminished by what has happened. Now that's my own judgment and I know that many competent observers disagree."

SUSSKIND: "A quick comment, Mr. Nixon from you, sir. What would be your posture, whether necessary or unnecessary, if the Russians were conducting aerial reconnaissance over our country, it were discovered and our government shot the plane down and captured the pilot. And the Soviet Union stated that it would continue to send aerial reconnaissance over our country. Wouldn't you take at the very least a dim view of that?"

NIXON: "You know, many years ago Mr. Franklin Roosevelt used to have a favorite answer to press conferences when he would say, 'That's an If-ty question,' and then he wouldn't answer. Now in this case certainly I say-- may I tell you why I think this is a hypothetical question that really doesn't deserve an answer. Because this is impossible. We're an open

society. It isn't necessary for the Soviet Union to fly planes over the United States to find out what's in the United States. We even furnish them with the pictures ourselves and the President said in a meeting a few days ago, 'We furnish them in color as to what's going on here.' Now, my point then, is then, that the problem that we're confronted with here is altogether different, from the standpoint of the United States, from the problem that confronts the Soviet Union because they do have closed society. I can tell you from my own trip to the Soviet Union that obtaining information there is almost impossible unless you're in the air, I would say. And we know it's very different in the United States. And, so I submit to you, that while you can put this out as a hypothetical question, you would have to add, let's suppose that the United States were also a closed society, a great totalitarian state, and the planes flew over, and that supposition goes completely beyond the realm of possibility. So that's my answer to your question."

SUSKIND: "Mr. Vice President, several more issues pertaining to the U-2 incident come to mind that I think are really important. Have we not by the statement that we shall continue such reconnaissance over Soviet territory--have we not placed our allies, Turkey, Pakistan, Norway--Japan is now deeply worried about it--in a desperately untenable position in the sense, that they are now faced with the alternative of violating the canons of international law or disavowing the United States. Isn't that a great danger to our cause, to our side?"

NIXON: "Well I come back again to my theme that the responsibility here rests squarely on Mr. Khrushchev. If he will participate in the very reasonable proposals that have been made by the President and our associates,

at this conference, for moving against surprise attack, the necessity for this, or any other kind of activity of this type will have been removed.

"Now you have mentioned our allies. They too have a stake in avoiding surprise attack. It isn't just the United States and they know this. And I would say that until we get through this conference, when we can take another look at it, that we should not jump to the conclusion that as to what our allies may feel about the situation.

SUSSKIND: "They've jumped to the conclusion..."

NIXON: "Oh of course..."

SUSSKIND: "...Mr. Nixon..."

NIXON: "...they have..."

SUSSKIND: "...and they're desperately worried. They lie under the muzzle of the Soviet ballistic missiles they--that's a strained phrase, I guess--they're in danger and they are alarmed and notes have been served upon their governments that should their bases and their countries be used they will be visited by a retaliation quick, and well, I guess, final. They want an answer from us. Failing to answer them satisfactorily, I think we may alienate them, giving them no choice, but to disavow us in this particular policy area. Is our State Department in your view, treating with that issue now; is the solution impending, an answer?"

NIXON: "The State Department is certainly concerned about this and is discussing the matter with our allies. And, I again, say that they will be watching this conference, as we will be watching it, to see what progress can be made with the Soviet Union on the problem of surprise attack so what we can remove the necessity for this kind of operation in the future.

SUSSKIND: "If no progress is made on the open skies approach, as

progress was not made previously, would we then, in your view, have to reexamine our policy of continued aerial reconnaissance in view of satisfying our allies that we have not placed them in incredible danger."

NIXON: "I would say that when a conference of this magnitude is being conducted, that I would not want to go so far as to indicate that, even by answering a hypothetical question, that I had no hope that progress could be made. I believe that this matter, this issue is of such importance that it will be discussed and that we should give the conferences every opportunity to discuss it before indicating hypothetically what we will or will not do if it should fail to deal with the issue."

ROSENBERG: "Mr. Nixon, another question that worries a good many people in this country. For 18 months, in Geneva, the three powers, United States, Britain and Russia, have been attempting to make progress on cessation of testing of atomic weapons. And strangely enough in the past few months quite substantial progress has been made. The key issue that has impeded us through the 18 months is the whole area of espionage, the hypersensitivity of the Soviet Union with respect to their borders being violated, their secrets being ascertained. And we have assured through painstaking efforts of James Wadsworth, over a sustained period, that we are trying to build walls of protection against espionage that would admit of progress on atomic testing cessation. Now an intricate system of permanent control posts and inspection teams has been almost agreed upon. Did not this incident, does not this new policy of continued aerial reconnaissance threaten the very substantial and critically important progress that has been achieved at the Geneva Conference.

NIXON: "Again, I think the conference at Paris will tell us a great deal as to what the answer to that question would be. I would also point out that as far as this incident is concerned that Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that he has known about these flights for a considerable period of time. If knowing of these flights, over a considerable period of time, he has yet instructed his representatives at Geneva to reach the agreement or at least the area of agreement to which you have already referred, it would seem to me that that would indicate that the fact that there was an open acknowledgement of the flight would not have appreciable effect in destroying the progress that had been made."

ROSENBERG: "If any setback in Geneva is a consequence of this incident, you would regard that as an unmitigated tragedy wouldn't you?"

NIXON: "I would, yes."

SUSSEKIND: "Well, let. . ."

NIXON: "May I say that I don't believe that this incident will cause the setback to the test negotiations. I don't believe so because I think that those test negotiations stand on their own merits; they have been going on separately, as you know, from the surprise attack negotiations. The Soviet Union has shown a great desire to reach an agreement; we have shown a great desire to reach an agreement, and there may be other roadblocks to an agreement, but I don't believe that this incident in itself will have destroyed the possibility for an agreement."

SUSSEKIND: "Mr. Nixon, I thought by way of summarizing our discussion on this issue, I would like to give you two short quotations and ask you which one you endorse."

"The New York Times editorial said the following: 'Intelligent activity is not an end in itself, but an arm of policies serving the national interest.' It went on to say that this incident at this time, (in its view, the New York Times) seemed to be a manifestation of protocol stupidity."

"On the other hand, Mr. Eisenhower at his recent press conference said: 'The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed nonmilitary plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy."

"Which of those two statements? . . ."

NIXON: "I agree with the second. I agree with the second. And I can speak with great feeling on that because I know about this flight and I also have considerable knowledge of the espionage activities that Mr. Khrushchev and his representatives have conducted in the United States and all over the world. We, of course, could have seized upon incidents of those type, as he has, to block the road to settlement of international differences. It seems

to me, if I may just quote Mr. Khrushchev, out of context, You recall when Mr. Powers, or at least when he alleged that, and I have no reason to doubt that this is the case, when he alleged that Mr. Powers was still living. He said that he was supposed to destroy the plane and he didn't. And then as I recall he said, the reason is that everything alive wants to continue to live. Now, this is a very, very sage and I believe true statement. But the fact that everything alive wants to continue to live will be motivating Mr. Khrushchev as well as the other leaders at the Summit, regardless of what has happened as the result of this U-2 incident, regardless of the criticisms that can be made. And I recognize that reasonable men can raise great questions about the advisability of what our first reaction was, the advisability of admitting anything at all, and some may question the timing. But I would say that as we look at this incident it served one useful purpose and that was to bring forcibly to the attention of the world the great danger that hangs over all of us; that is, war coming from surprise attack or miscalculation which would destroy the world. And Mr. Khrushchev, I can assure you, is no more interested in having Leningrad and Moscow and other cities taken out and we aren't having New York and Washington taken out. And these would be the factors that would be motivating him at this, at this conference, as it would be motivating us. And they will affect his attitude on Berlin; they will affect his attitude on tests, they will affect his attitude on the other problems with which he and we are confronted. Now, I'm not suggesting by this that this means that agreement, therefore, is inevitable. But I do suggest, that in today's world, incidents of this type that should, in times past, might have destroyed a conference altogether. In times past leaders might not have even come to a conference. That incidents like this can no longer have that effect and will no longer have that effect. we all

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have to learn to live together or we're going to die together."

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SUSSKIND: "A final question and a short one, sir. Will you privy to the U-2 Serial reconnaissance policy and did you indorse it?"

NIXON: "I was privy to it and I do indorse it."

SUSSKIND: "Thank you."

* * * * *

SUSSKIND: "Mister Vice President, another issue on which a lot of Americans are troubled today concerns the announcement, just last week, about the resumption of underground nuclear testing. Again, that seems to be a product of exquisitely bad planning coming on the heels of the U-2 incident, not having forewarned even our allies of the announcement because we obviously caught Great Britain by surprise. And also the notion of resuming testing just a little ahead of, again the Summit meeting, seems to be indicative of consummate insensitivity to world opinion. Would you comment on that? On, again, the timing. First let's talk about the timing, then I'd like to ask you about the resumption itself."

NIXON: "Well let me say first that the -- I think you commented very effectively, and I disagree of course. First, with regard to the timing, the timing of this announcement was not designed to counterbalance the reaction to the U-2. Second, of course, as you know, the tests that are being resumed are not weapons tests."

* * * * *

(Suskind asks about proximity of resumption of nuclear tests & U-2 incident)

NIXON: "Getting to your point of timing. You may question the timing, but the timing was not a result of choosing this particular time because of what had happened at, with regard to the U-2."

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(DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

(DPO 104)

{ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED}

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1960,
12:45PM EDT

MR. WHITE: I apologize for keeping you waiting. I will go through my budget, and then we will get into what you are primarily interested in.

Q. Couldn't we do that first?

A. This will only take a second, Frank (Bourgholtzer).

For those who were not over earlier, we have the statement by Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee (see Press Release No. 244) on Sino-Soviet Bloc Trade and Its Implications for the United States. Secondly, we have announced that Mr. Jack Bennett has been named ICA Regional Director for Near East and South Asia (see Press Release No. 245).

Now, the Department has been informed by NASA that as announced May 3 an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the USSR on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

That is the end of the statement.

Q. What was the plane doing, weather reconnaissance?

A. NASA is briefing reporters on the full details of that.

Q. Link, when you say you are taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, do you mean you are asking for information on the pilot, or making a protest about the plane?

-2-

A. This matter is being taken up with the Soviet Government, John (Hightower), through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Q. Yes, but it is a protest or an inquiry?

A. I can't say just what form it will take at this stage. I would think, initially, an inquiry.

Q. Is this the report which the White House announced would be made?

A. That is correct.

Q. You say it may be that this was the missing plane?

A. Yes.

Q. There are other planes missing or --

A. Not that I am aware of.

Q. -- unaccounted for?

A. No, not that I am aware of.

Q. You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U.S. Air Force Base down there?

A. As I say, you better get this information from NASA; but let me give you a brief rundown, which I do not wish attributed to State Department. This, in infinitely more detail, is being given out at NASA.

This plane is a Lockheed U-2, and it is used for upper air weather studies. It is a single engine airplane powered by Pratt & Whitney J-57. It was a test plane when it became obvious that it could maintain flight at a height of 50,000 feet for three to four hours. Arrangements were made by NASA, then NACA, to get a number of aircraft for the weather studies. The weather programs ~~have been carried out~~ by the Air Weather Service serving as executive agent for NASA, inasmuch as we do not have overseas facilities for such work. The pilots are Lockheed test pilots on contract to NASA. These flights have been made in the United States, in the Far East, and in the Middle East.

That is about the extent of it. You can get the information from NASA. I am doing this in consideration of those who are not able ^{to} be in two places at the same time.

-3-

Q. Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do you have anything on that?

A. We have absolutely no -- N-O, no -- information on that at all.

Q. Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?

A. I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NAGA can give you that information, Paul (Ward). I have nothing on it.

Q. Link, the area where this plane disappeared is the same as the other plane --

A. This is the Lake Van area.

Q. Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in 1958?

A. In the neighborhood of it.

Q. Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?

A. He reported it.

Q. He reported it by radio?

A. That is right.

Q. At the time did he give his position?

A. In the Lake Van area.

Q. Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have taken him over the Soviet Union?

A. John (Hightower), I don't have those details.

Q. Was that the last communication from him, Link?

A. As far as I knew.

Q. What was the question?

A. The question was, was that the last communication from the pilot, and to my knowledge it was.

Q. Is the name of this pilot being released by somebody?

A. Here I would like to go OFF THE RECORD. This man's mother is a cardiac patient, and her doctor is seriously concerned about her learning this news over the radio or in the papers before the

-4-

doctor can quietly explain it to her. He has not yet had an opportunity to do that.

That is the situation.

Q. His name has not been made public?

A. No. I have it, but I would hope you would let me off on this until the doctor is able to inform the mother.

Q. Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Government?

A. No, sir, it has not.

Q. Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of aggressive American action?

A. No.

Q. Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communication from the Soviets?

A. Nothing prior to this.

Q. Thank you, very much.

A. Yes, sir.

Lincoln White

mjc

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

MAY 17, 1960

PR 271

Following is the text of the statement by President Eisenhower, following the May 16 meeting of the Four Heads of Government:

Having been informed yesterday by General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan of the position which Mr. Khrushchev has taken in regard to this Conference during his calls yesterday morning on them, I gave most careful thought as to how this matter should best be handled. Having in mind the great importance of this Conference and the hopes that the peoples of all the world have reposed in this meeting, I concluded that in the circumstances it was best to see if at today's private meeting any possibility existed through the exercise of reason and restraint to dispose of this matter of the overflights, which would have permitted the Conference to go forward.

I was under no illusion as to the probability of success of any such approach but I felt that in view of the great responsibility resting on me as President of the United States, this effort should be made.

In this I received the strongest support of my colleagues, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Accordingly, at this morning's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms:

I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just read by Premier Khrushchev.

In my statement of May 11th and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9th the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union.

There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The

importance

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importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my Government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference.

Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection. For its part, the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance.

We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the important problems before this Conference. We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the USSR while the main Conference proceeds.

My words were seconded and supported by my Western colleagues, who also urged Mr. Khrushchev to pursue the path of reason and common sense, and to forget propaganda. Such an attitude would have permitted the Conference to proceed. Mr. Khrushchev was left in no doubt by me that his ultimatum would never be acceptable to the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev brushed aside all arguments of reason, and not only insisted upon this ultimatum, but also insisted that he was going to publish his statement in full at the time of his own choosing. It was thus made apparent that he was determined to wreck the Paris Conference.

In fact, the only conclusion that can be drawn from his behavior this morning was that he came all the way from Moscow to Paris with the sole intention of sabotaging this meeting on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested.

In spite of this serious and adverse development, I have no intention whatsoever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress toward a peace with justice. This applies to the remainder of my stay in Paris.

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* * *

State--RD, Wash., D.C.

MAY 10 1960

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Text of Statement on Plane

Following is the text of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter's statement on the United States plane shot down by the Russians:

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict, in 1946, and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Viet-Nam, the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the Free World and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled.

With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

The Proposal Cited

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the United States, the U.S.S.R. and other nations that might wish to participate.

For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis.

More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

Responsibility Noted

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but the free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration.

Specific missions of these

unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This Government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the heads of government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev will be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from

the minds of people everywhere.

Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President,

the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

Attachment #1 to

T. S. 155428

Copy # 4

Transcript of President's News Conference

Gromyko Remarks

Q. (MERRIMAN SMITH, United Press International)—Mr. President, quite aside from your comment about the U2 plane episode, sir, I wonder if you could give us your reaction to a rather denunciatory speech made this morning, right ahead of the summit meeting, by the Russian Foreign Minister.

Mr. Gromyko attributes to this country deeds and efforts which he said amount to dangerous ways of balancing on the brink of war. He says that the United States has deliberately engaged in provocative acts in conjunction with some of our allies.

Now, with statements like this, do you still maintain a hopeful attitude toward the summit?

THE PRESIDENT—Well, I'd say yes. I have some hope, because these things have been said for many years, ever since World War II, and there is no real change in this matter.

Now, if we—I wonder how many of you people have read the full text of the Able trial, the record of the trial of Mr. Able. Well, I think he was sentenced to 30 years. Now, this business of saying that you're doing

things that are provocative, why they had better look at their own record.

And I'll tell you this: The United States and none of its allies that I know of has engaged in nothing that would be considered honestly as provocative. We are looking to our own security and our defense and we have no idea of promoting any kind of conflict or war. This is just, it's absolutely ridiculous, and they know it is.

Soviet Flights

Q. (HENRY N. TAYLOR, Scripps-Howard)—Mr. President, sir, would it be trespassing on your request about the U2 to ask if you could tell us something about any possible Soviet-reconnaissance flights over the Western part of the world, and our response to them, if any?

THE PRESIDENT—Well, I can just say this: As far as I know, there has never been any over the United States.

Spy Trial

Q. (CHARLES W. ROBERTS, Newsweek)—Sir, in connection with the Able trial which you mentioned—

THE PRESIDENT—Yes.

Q. (ROBERTS)—The Soviet government in that case made no effort to defend Colonel Abel. I wonder if an American citizen were arrested by a foreign government and brought to trial as a spy, what the policy of this Government would be so far as his defense was concerned.

THE PRESIDENT—Well, we would certainly offer the good offices of our Embassy, and see whether there was anything we could do. Of course, we would have to do it, it would be an internal matter there, and we would have to do it with the permission of the other country.

So far as I—I think that if there is anything wrong diplomatically with my answer, you had better ask the State Department, but I think that would be the result.

Soviet Threat

Q. (MARVIN L. ARROW, SMITH, Associated Press)—Mr. President, you have said many times that you wouldn't go to the summit under any threats or ultimatums.

Yesterday, as you know, the Soviets in their note threatened retaliation against us if we continued to fly these planes over their territory.

Do you regard that kind of threat as within the category you were speaking of?

THE PRESIDENT—No. I think that you have to set that aside in a special category. I don't believe it's the kind of thing that you call an ultimatum at all.

Statement

Q. (EDWARD P. MORGAN, ABC)—Mr. President, a point of clarification, Mr. President: Do we infer correctly that your prepared statement this morning is the final, complete and ultimate answer to your critics, friendly and hostile, on the subject?

THE PRESIDENT—I said that at this time I could see nothing useful more that could say, so that's where I stand at this moment.

The U2 Story

Q. (JOHN SCALLI, Associated Press)—Mr. President, you said in your initial statement that the Soviet account of the downing of this plane contained many discrepancies, and that there was reason to doubt that the plane was downed at a high altitude, as Mr. Khrushchev claims.

Can you tell us, sir, whether the Administration at some future time intends to expose these discrepancies and can you at this time without violating what you have said, give us any more details about how we believe this plane actually came down in the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT—Well, I don't think I am—you raise a question that is really an auxiliary to the main issue, and so I don't mind saying this: that, take the pictures themselves; we know that they were not, or we believe we know that they are not pictures of the plane that was downed, and there are other things in their statements.

Now, I don't know what's going to happen in the future, but these things you can be sure will be carefully looked into. And, as again I say, I do not foreclose any kind of statement that in the future may be necessary; I am saying that now I can see nothing more useful to say.

Soviet Note to Swiss

LONDON, May 14 (Reuters) —Following is the text of a Soviet note to Switzerland on the expulsion of two Soviet embassy officials as issued in English today by the Soviet press agency Tass:

The ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. deems it necessary to communicate to the Swiss Embassy the following:

On May 11 this year the Swiss Government issued a statement to the effect that the Swiss police arrested in Zurich on May 10 two officials of the Soviet Embassy in Switzerland allegedly for impermissible activity.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. declares that the actions by the Swiss police are a gross provocation.

In fact, two officials of the Soviet Embassy in Switzerland, N. K. Modin and R. Frolov, were detained and interrogated by Swiss police agencies in Zurich on May 10 1960. In doing so the police-men treated Modin and Frolov rudely, searched them and seized all their personal belongings. In spite of Modin's and Frolov's demand to enable them to contact the Soviet Embassy in Switzerland, they were not allowed to do so.

On the morning of May 11 Swiss police in Bern arrested N. S. Larionov, the driver of the U. S. S. R. Embassy, also without explaining any reasons, interrogated him and thoroughly searched his car. Larionov was told at the police station that this was being done on orders from Switzerland's Political Department (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Larionov's request for contacting the Embassy was likewise declined.

The Embassy of the U. S. S. R., on having learned of the aforementioned illegal actions of the Swiss authorities with respect to the Embassy officials, Modin, Frolov and Larionov, declared a protest to the Political Department of Switzerland on the morning of May 11 and demanded the immediate release of the aforementioned officials of the Embassy.

On May 11, Modin, Frolov and Larionov were released, and the former two were told

to leave Switzerland. In a conversation with the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., following the Embassy's protest to the Political Department of Switzerland, the general secretary of the Political Department Kohn sought to motivate the demand that Modin and Frolov leave the country by saying that they had been detained allegedly for impermissible actions, even though no proof was submitted of this ridiculous charge.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., on instructions of the Soviet Government, protests to the Government of Switzerland against the provocative actions undertaken by the Swiss authorities with regard to officials of the Embassy of the U. S. S. R. in Switzerland. These actions cannot be qualified otherwise than as taken in the interest of circles seeking to aggravate the international situation on the eve of a summit meeting.

After the exposure of the aggressive actions of the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union for the whole world to see, Washington set about feverishly trying to divert in one way or another, the attention of world public opinion from the disgraceful position the American Government and the American intelligence service found themselves in due to the piratic intrusion of the United States plane into the air space of the U. S. S. R. on May 1.

It is at this particular moment that the police authorities of Switzerland applied themselves to the unsavory mission of organizing an undisguised provocation against the Soviet Embassy officials by having leveled clumsy charges against them.

The Swiss Government cannot fail to see that such actions of the Swiss police cannot but complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Switzerland, with whom the U. S. S. R. strives to maintain friendly relations.

The Government of the U. S. S. R. expects the Swiss Government to take action toward punishing those responsible for the aforesaid provocation and preventing the recurrence of such unfriendly acts.

U. S. Aide Says Pilot Told Truth to Soviet

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, May 15 — George V. Allen, director of the United States Information Agency, declared today that the pilot of the reconnaissance plane downed over the Soviet Union did "when captured exactly what he had been instructed to do."

Mr. Allen said that when Francis G. Powers, the pilot, went down, "he told exactly what his mission was, exactly what he was expected to do."

"And he was under instructions to do that," Mr. Allen said, adding: "He gave an honest report of what his mission was and I think that ought to be realized by everyone concerned."

Mr. Allen's statement, made on the American Broadcasting Company's television program "College News Conference," was in contrast with Russian

reports.

The Russians have said that Mr. Powers was supposed to blow up his plane in the air and to commit suicide with a poisoned needle said to have been found in the flier's kit. They declared that they had tested the needle on a dog with fatal results.

Mr. Allen said United States diplomats in Moscow would do everything possible to see that Mr. Powers got a fair trial if the Russians were to try him as a spy, as they say they will. Although the United States Embassy in Moscow has been trying to see the pilot, there has been no confirmation that the Soviet government has granted this request.

Mr. Allen, whose agency directs the United States' foreign propaganda efforts, including the Voice of America broadcasts, also denied that Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had said that flights such as that of Mr. Powers over the Soviet Union would continue.

Denial on Herter Statement

He said Secretary Herter had "said that there is an obligation and responsibility on the part of the United States Government and the free world to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack, but he has not said we are going to continue to fly."

Mr. Allen said he would like to correct "a great misunderstanding" about what Mr. Herter had said.

Last Monday it was inferred from a statement issued by Secretary Herter that the United States would continue such flights. Premier Khrushchev reacted indignantly. The pertinent section of Mr. Herter's statement said:

"The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility."

Mr. Allen also discussed the State Department's first statement after the Soviet had announced that the United States plane was down and the pilot captured. He said the statement that the craft was a missing weather plane was a "push-button reply" that had been prepared in advance. The department's press officer, Lincoln White, made the reply in good faith, he said.

"One of the very difficult problems of the U-2," he said, "is the situation of our allies. It is perfectly obvious that our allies are naturally going to be much more concerned from now on about the actions taken from air bases in their territory."

MAY 16 1969

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TEXT

Eisenhower to Ask U. N. Air Surveillance

PARIS, May 16 (AP).—The text of a statement issued by President Eisenhower after today's summit conference session.

Having been informed yesterday by Gen. de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan of the position which Mr. Khrushchev has taken in regard to this conference during his calls yesterday morning on them, I gave most careful thought as to how this matter should best be handled. Having in mind the great importance, it was best to see if at today's private meeting any possibility existed through the exercise of reason and restraint to dispose of this matter of overflights, which would have permitted the conference to go forward.

I was under no illusion as to the probability of success of any such approach, but I felt that in view of the great responsibility resting on me as President of the United States this effort should be made.

Supported by Colleagues

In this I received the strongest support of my colleagues, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Accordingly, at this morning's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms:

I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just read by Premier Khrushchev.

In my statement of May 11 and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9, the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions.

No Aggression Intended

We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic war heads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union.

There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It al-

leges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

Flights Suspended

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference.

Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection.

Will Accept U.N. Action

For its part, the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance.

We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the important problems before this conference. We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the U. S. S. R. while the main conference proceeds.

My words were seconded and supported by my Western colleagues, who also urged Mr. Khrushchev to pursue the path of reason and common sense. An attitude would have permitted the conference to proceed. Mr. Khrushchev was left

in no doubt by me his ultimatum would never be acceptable to the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev brushed aside all arguments of reason and not only insisted upon his ultimatum, but also insisted that he was going to publish his statement in full at the time of his own choosing.

It was thus made apparent that he was determined to wreck the Paris conference.

In fact, the only conclusion that can be drawn from his behavior this morning was that he came all the way from Moscow to Paris with the sole intention of sabotaging this meeting on which so much of the hopes of the world have rested.

In spite of this serious and adverse development, I have no intention whatsoever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress toward a peace with justice. This applies Paris as well as thereafter.

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100100003-0

Transcript of the Questions and Answers at Khrushchev's News Conference

PARIS, May 18 (Reuters)—Following is the transcript of Premier Khrushchev's news conference here today, held after he made his prepared statement, with the Premier's remarks and those of non-English-speaking correspondents in unofficial translation.

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to ask your pardon but I want to address myself to that little group in the hall that is booing.

I have already been informed that Chancellor Adenauer has sent some of his ruffians that escaped the beating at Stalingrad and it is they that are indulging in this booing, they that we did not at that time send three meters underground.

Look to it, if you were not beaten at Stalingrad and in the Ukraine, we will give you such a boo that you will lose any desire to come into the hall and boo again.

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to draw your attention to the fact that they are reacting to my words without even listening to the translation.

They understand. These are the plunderers who came to the Soviet Union to plunder and pilage and they carried away their hands—they carried themselves away from the Soviet Union. They escaped a beating.

Represents Soviet People

The most important thing here is that you are all wise people, and you must certainly understand who is standing before you. I represent the great Soviet people, a people that has won victory in the Great October Revolution under the leadership of the great Lenin, a people that is now successfully building a Communist society, that is confidently marching forward to communism.


And you, this little group, represent those people of whom the Germans themselves will in time be ashamed. I am speaking of this German riffraff and not of the great German people.

Their booing heartens me, heartens and gratifies me because in the words of a great representative of the German people, August Bebel, "If your enemies are attacking you, then know it, Bebel, you are on the right track."

And if you boo me then this adds confidence to me and I understand that I, too, am on the right track.

I shall not conceal my pleasure. I like coming to grips with the enemies of the working class and it is gratifying for me to hear frenzy of these lackeys of imperialism. Nothing they attempt to do will gain them any good. The Soviet Union, firm as a rock, is marching forward to build communism and will continue to march forward till the complete triumph of communism in the Soviet Union.

Now thank you for your attention, Ladies and Gentlemen. I shall do my best to answer to the full any questions that you may have to ask me.



EMOTIONAL DISPLAY: Premier Khrushchev shows alternating outbursts of belligerence and good humor. At left, almost two-and-a-half hours after news conference yesterday at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris.

View on Geneva Talks

DAILY SKETCH, London—Can Chairman Khrushchev continue the talks on disarmament and on the suspension of nuclear tests?

A.—We shall continue our negotiations in Geneva. The American imperialists have received some clarification of late. They received an eye-opener in Sverdlovsk. And if they understand that, then there is a possibility to reach agreement on the discontinuance of tests. But if Eisenhower threatens that he will continue testing, then we, too, will follow suit until the whole world learns who are the true guilty parties and who is resisting agreement.

We at any time are ready to sign such an agreement.

The disarmament negotiations are another matter altogether. We are almost convinced that our partners in these disarmament negotiations do not want disarmament but want simply control over armaments, which is in other words the collection of espionage information. We will not agree to this. We are for true disarmament, for true control measures, so that no one should threaten any one else.

What is going on now at Geneva is merely procrastination. But if this procrastination goes on, we will be compelled to approach the United Nations and to say that our partners do not want to reach agreement and that we are asking the United Nations General Assembly to consider the matter.

Insists on Assurances

BRIDGEPORT HERALD, (Connecticut)—If your allegations regarding the U-2 incident are true or even worse, don't you think that as the great leader of a great state and knowing that truth is on your side it would be better to have the summit conference now than in six or eight months' time, considering the state of tension?

A.—Yes, we are in favor of holding a summit conference. That is why we came to Paris. But the United States must admit its aggressive intrusion, must condemn its act, give assurances that such acts would not be repeated and must punish the guilty party. Then, if it had done so, we would be satisfied and we would have taken part in the summit conference, to seek correct solutions for the questions confronting it. But the United States refused to do this.

How then are we to negotiate with an aggressor, with a state that has committed aggression, and the conference is saying that these flights are United States policy?

Ladies and Gentlemen, we all have mothers. You all do, too, otherwise you couldn't have come into this world.

I remember during my youth I was born in a very poor family and it was only very rarely that my mother could buy us some cream. But sometimes when she did our cat would creep up and eat some of the cream, would steal some of the cream. Then my mother usually took the cat by the scruff of the neck and gave it a good shaking and in the end would poke its nose into the cream to make it understand that such stealing was not allowed.

Wouldn't it be better, Ladies and Gentlemen, to take the American aggressors by the scruff of the neck also and give them a little shaking and make them understand they must not commit such acts of aggression against the Soviet Union?

Peaceful Means Affirmed

DIE WELT, Hamburg—Do you still consider that international issues should be resolved by peaceful means?

A.—Yes, I reaffirm that our policy has always been to solve disputed issues not by means of war but by peaceful negotiations. That is the policy we have always adhered to and continue to adhere to now.

Do you still adhere to your former proposal regarding the transformation of West Berlin into a free city?

A.—Yes, I still adhere to this policy and we see no other reasonable way out. West Berlin is situated in the center of the German Democratic Republic, which is a Socialist republic, whereas the system in West Berlin is a capitalist one.

These two systems are antagonistic and this is always fraught with a conflict. Why should we have such a situation? Wouldn't it be better to take a better decision, that is to insure West Berlin a free city status, withdraw all foreign troops and make it possible for the inhabitants of West Berlin to choose the social system under which they want to live, the one which satisfies them the most, and, of course, on the condition that they are as-

Text of Statement by the Soviet Premier

Before His News Conference

NEW YORK TIMES

9 May 1960

PARIS, May 18 (Reuters)—Following is the official English translation of the text of Premier Khrushchev's prepared statement at his news conference here today:

Ladies and Gentlemen, You obviously know the statement which I made on May 16 to President de Gaulle of France, Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain and President Eisenhower of the United States.

The circumstances under which the Soviet Government deemed it necessary to make this statement are generally known. I have in view the aggressive flights of American warplanes over the Soviet Union, undertaken on the eve of the summit conference, and the public declaration of the United States Government that such flights are its official policy.

Now attempts are being made to lay the blame on us for the alleged refusal of the Soviet Union to take part in the meeting and for making some sort of ultimatums to the United States.

But we have declared and we declare that we are ready to take part in the conference if the United States Government makes up publicly for the insult inflicted upon our country by its aggressive actions. However, we are still not sure that the espionage flights, which are undertaken by the United States, will not be repeated.

Just recall the behavior of the United States leaders after they were caught red-handed. I shall refer to documents, and documents alone.

U. S. Version Is Recalled

On May 5, when all the world learned that an American warplane was brought down over Soviet territory, the Department of State declared that it was an aircraft which flew over Turkey to collect meteorological information. It was claimed also that the pilot radioed back that he had trouble with his oxygen equipment. As a result of this, the pilot allegedly lost consciousness and the plane, steered for quite a time by its automatic pilot, could have accidentally in-

truded into the Soviet air space.

It was reported that a search was carried on for this plane in Turkish territory around Lake Van, where the terrain is very mountainous.

When we announced that the American plane had been shot down in the area of Sverdlovsk and that the captured pilot had owned up to being a spy, the United States Secretary of State Herter said on May 9 that it was indeed a spy plane.

More, he said that such flights were being made on the President's instruction and in accordance with a program which provided for extensive aerial surveillance, including "by penetration" of the Soviet airspace. It was a brazen statement on the part of Mr. Herter.

On May 11, President Eisenhower himself confirmed Herter's statement.

On May 12, the United States Embassy in Moscow, in its note to the Soviet Government, again said that aggressive espionage flights were a calculated policy of the United States.

And now, in Paris, the President of the United States issues a statement to the effect that the United States has "suspended" its flights and will not resume them.

Some people ask, referring to this statement: What else does the Soviet Union need? It would seem that the threat of flights by American military planes over the Soviet Union is thus removed.

'Servitors of Imperialism'

Such a statement may have satisfied the servitors of imperialism. The imperialists have grown accustomed to behaving like Russian merchants did of old: they painted the lackeys' lips with mustard, and the latter said, "thank you" and bowed low.

We will not tolerate insults, we have our pride and our dignity. We represent a mighty Socialist state.

But then Eisenhower said at the preliminary meeting on May 16 that what he had meant by his statement about the suspension of overflights by American military planes was that they would not be

resumed for the remainder of his tenure as President.

He said he did not know, naturally, what decision the next President would take. Thus, what the President of the United States promises is not renunciation of aggressive policy, but merely a temporary "suspension" of flights till January, 1961.

It is not for a long period that Mr. President promises us to discontinue the provocative policy of espionage flights. But international relations cannot be built on the term of office of this or that official, for what would then be the worth of any international agreement.

If we followed the American President's logic, it would be impossible to negotiate on, say, disarmament. An agreement may, conceivably, be signed today, but lose force tomorrow and be thrown into the wastepaper basket because the person who signed it would leave his post.

To hear President Eisenhower, it would seem that the question of whether American military planes will or will not overfly the U. S. S. R. depends on him and him alone.

Just think, what presumption! He now says they will not overfly. What magnanimity!

Of course, it is for President Eisenhower to decide whether to send or not to send his planes. But it is another question whether they will be able to overfly our territory. This is decided by us, and very definitely for that matter—we shall shoot these planes down, we shall administer shattering blows at the bases whence they come and at those who have set up these bases and actually dispose of them.

The point in question, therefore, is not some sort of "favor" to the Soviet Union on the part of President Eisenhower. We do not ask "favors" of the United States Government, but honest condemnation of the bandit flights of American intelligence planes.

However, President Eisenhower did not utter a single word of condemnation with regard to the provocative policy against the Soviet

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET PREMIER
BEFORE HIS NEWS CONFERENCE (Cont'd)

Union, on the strength of which the spy flights were undertaken.

Can such a statement by the President satisfy anyone but the aggressor himself?

Eisenhower's statement that he has suspended these provocative flights for the term he remains in the White House is not a confession, not even a semi-confession, but an attempt to dodge confession and consequently responsibility for his aggressive actions. But subterfuges and even semi-confessions of political leaders have never helped them to avoid historical responsibility. Even the children are told: If you do something bad—own up and say you "won't do it again." In government affairs, it is even more important to make complete confessions and draw all the necessary conclusions.

Premier Voices Surprise

The Soviet people, public opinion in our and all other peaceful countries, would not understand us if we contented ourselves with the American President's dodges and the "favor" he "graciously" did us by stopping flights over the Soviet Union till January, 1961.

Nor could we fail to be surprised by Eisenhower's statement, which looked like a threat that he planned to submit to the United Nations a new "open skies" plan.

After the Pentagon had realized that the Soviet skies were closed to American spy planes, the people there apparently decided to send planes with the same aims but under the United Nations flag. It is to be hoped that the United Nations is not an American state, not a branch of the Pentagon, and will decline this humiliating role.

Some of you say in your dispatches that flights by American air pirates over the Soviet Union are only a small incident." You represent here the press of various states, and I would like to ask you what would you think of your government if it treated with indifference, with unconcern, the overflights of your cities by military planes of countries of

which you yourselves sometimes write as potential opponents?

Would you respect such a government? Would your families and you yourselves feel safe listening to the drone of an alien military plane over your heads?

But the Soviet people have as much right to think in this way, the more so since the peoples of our country have vivid memories of two murderous wars imposed on us from without, two wars which took a toll of tens of millions of lives.

New Course Discerned

It is indicative that the governments of the countries that have rashly lent their territories for the preparation and carrying out of aggressive spy flights over Soviet territory, are now compelled to right themselves in this or other measure before public opinion and disavow the actions of the American military. They, apparently, have begun to realize—and we are sure that this will soon be realized by everybody who opened their land for the establishment of American war bases—that such things are not to be trifled with.

The Soviet Government regrets that it was impossible to hold the conference now, but, as I have already said, it could not act otherwise. We have done everything to prepare well the heads-of-government meeting, but some hotheads in the United States of America have torpedoed it even before it could be opened.

I repeat, gentlemen, the Soviet Union is firmly for peaceful coexistence, for talks, for the reaching of reasonable, mutually acceptable agreements.

We shall work in this direction, confident that our peace-loving policy meets with the sympathy and understanding of all nations, and we should like to believe that the Western leaders will also strive toward this end, that within six or eight months we shall again meet with our partners in a new, more favorable atmosphere, if they show interest and agreement to have this meeting, if they create the necessary political atmosphere for it, for the discus-

sion and the signing of urgent international treaties—that is, if they do not undertake provocations against the Socialist states.

We Cannot Be Bent'

This can happen even sooner, but only if everybody realizes that no one will be able to intimidate the Soviet Union, the Socialist states, by any provocative actions whatsoever! We cannot be bent!

Negotiations and agreements with us are possible only on the basis of equality, without threats or blackmail.

I should like to thank the President of France, General de Gaulle for enabling the heads of government to meet in Paris, for the efforts he made so that the summit should take place, so that our meetings should be held as agreed upon and conform to the aims for which we have come here.

Today I paid a farewell call on the President of France. We exchanged our views, and I am happy to say that a common striving was revealed to continue to exert efforts for the development and strengthening of our relations in every way. I welcome this and I express my satisfaction that the President and I agree on this most important question.

I should also like to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, for his understanding and the efforts he made so that the summit meeting takes place.

And yet, I cannot fail to express some regret as well. If the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain assumed the position of the objective appraisal of facts instead of yielding to their Allied ties, if they displayed more will, the leaders of the United States might perhaps have been obliged to condemn their aggressive actions, and conditions would thereby have been created enabling the summit conference to take place and yield the beneficent results hopefully awaited by all the peoples of the world.

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TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT LINDSEY HOUSE, 1955

Critics of U.S. in Britain Told They Are Off Beam

LONDON, May 18 — Are three mammoth metal balls rising above the landscape of a national park in Yorkshire a sign that Britain is "in pawn to Uncle Sam?" The Government denies it.

A Labor Member of Parliament indicated today that he thought so, even though the function of the spheres, each 14 feet in diameter, is to help give advance warning of an enemy missile attack. The spheres are to form part of the early-warning station being built on Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire.

G. R. Chetwynd asked the Government to deny that "the erection of these three brass balls was not a visible sign that we were in pawn to Uncle Sam in this part of a national park."

George Ward, Secretary for Air, answered: "I know some Labor members would like to blackball the whole project, but personally I think it is a very useful one."

David with President Eisenhower I almost opened my mouth to make that statement.

I was on the point of making it because the atmosphere there was so convivial with President Eisenhower telling me to call him "My friend" in English and using the same words with regard to myself in Russian. And then, thought I, why not raise the matter with this friend of mine.

His Choice for President

But when I became apprehensive and I thought there was something fishy about this friend of mine and I didn't broach the subject and it turned out that I was right, because when we caught them red-handed they say they are not thieves, it's just their thief-like policy. That is all.

This recalls to my mind what we used to do in the Donbas when I was the young boy. Whenever we caught a cat in the pigeon's loft, we would catch the cat by its tail and bang its head against the wall and that was the only way it could be taught some sense.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM—Since, because

by desire or not, you have become a factor in the American political campaign, would you care to say which President you would prefer to deal with?

A.—I thank you for that question. It is a good question, although rather a difficult one to reply to. Nevertheless, I will try to reply.

When I was in the United States, I talked with very many Americans, ordinary people, with people who are wealthy, with representatives of the capitalist world, the statesmen, the farmers. And I retained very good and, I may even say, pleasant memories of my conversations with most of these people.

People everywhere are just like people and they all want peace. Perhaps they understand it in their own way, but that should certainly not be the ground for any conflict. Perhaps they don't agree with my understanding and I don't agree with their belief that the capitalism system is better. But that certainly should not be the object of any conflict and, all the more so, of a war.

I am sure that the majority of Americans regret the act perpetrated by the American Air Force.

It is true there are some Americans who have been kidded into indignation against the acts of the Soviet Union but to this I can but reply, how would they themselves feel if we were to fly our aircraft over their country.

But they would certainly come to the conclusion that such flights are absolutely inadmissible, that this can only end in aggression, can only bring about a war.

Regarding the question of who, in my opinion, will become the United States President, there certainly was a person to my liking, a person with whom I am sure we could have reached agreement.

He was a great American. His name was Roosevelt and he was a worthy representative of the capitalist society, but we cooperated with him very well indeed during World War II. When he died his policy died with him.

But we are convinced that persons will come to power in the United States who will pronounce themselves in

favor of reaching mutually acceptable agreements.

We have nothing to quarrel about with the American people. They are in favor of capitalism, that is their business and even then it is not all the American people who are in favor of capitalism because many of them are simply under the oppression of the capitalistic system.

But let them come, why doesn't everyone come to the Soviet Union and see for themselves what kind of a life we are now leading.

Let even those who have been booing here come. We'll give them visas, too, and perhaps even they will see the light if they come.

Our country is now second in the world in its industrial production, in science and in culture. If I don't perhaps modestly say that we are first in the world, we certainly do occupy a worthy place in human society.

But I do not want to interfere in the American political scene. We should maintain an attitude of patience and not try to forecast who will come to the fore in the United States elections. The American people will themselves elect their worthy representative as President. elect someone who would not understand the necessity of reaching agreement we can wait we have waited and we wait and, if the next President doesn't understand that, we can wait some more. We don't need to hurry, we have long ago chosen the correct path. We have long ago determined the correct line of our development and we are convinced that our choice was made correctly and we are marching confidently ahead to the building of a Communist society.

You, perhaps, in time will also understand that this is the only true road and perhaps you, too, will join this road but even then you will not even be parallel with us, you will be lagging behind and trailing in our wake. But we don't hold that against you, we'll help you to catch up and share our experience with you.

COMBAT, Paris — Mr. Chairman, you agreed to come to France despite the facts of the U-2 incident and knowing of the categorical position taken by America. Were you con-

Questioned on Peace Pact

DER TAG, Berlin—Do you intend to conclude a separate peace treaty in Berlin? (There were additional shouts of "and when?")

A.—Yes, we do intend to sign not a separate peace, but a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and thus to put an end finally to World War II. In that case, the Western powers will be deprived of their occupation rights, the right to maintain their troops in West Berlin. When? That is our business. When we consider the time to be right, we will take our fountain pens from our pockets—the necessary drafts have already been prepared and the drafts will be—we will sit down and sign the peace treaty and announce it to the world.

I would like to add we are simply intending to do what the United States did with regard to Japan.

We fought in the war together with the United States against Japan. But the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan. But we didn't are exerting all efforts to prove the necessity to sign a peace treaty together, but we have now almost reached the limits of our patience and of our effort to have a peace treaty signed together and when we do reach the limit we will sign such a treaty by ourselves just as, I repeat, the United States did with regard to Japan.

Recalls Camp David Mood

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY—Why, since you knew about these flights, did you not tell President Eisenhower about them and ask him to stop them when you visited the United States.

A.—I will answer that question with pleasure. When we were talking in Camp

sured freedom of external ties with the world.

This recent conflict with the United States aircraft convinces us all the more that these questions must be solved as we are approaching the matter with ever greater resolve and urgency. By the way, tomorrow I am flying to Berlin. We will talk with our comrades, Ulbricht and Grotewohl, and in general with our friends in the German Democratic Republic.

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I would like to add we are simply intending to do what the United States did with regard to Japan.

We fought in the war together with the United States against Japan. But the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan. But we didn't. We are exerting all efforts to prove the necessity to sign a peace treaty together, but we have now almost reached the limits of our patience and of our effort to have a peace treaty signed together and when we do reach the limit we will sign such a treaty by ourselves just as, I repeat, the United States did with regard to Japan.

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I am not sure that questions are placed when we are talking in Camp

Critics of U.S. in Britain Told They Are Off Beam

LONDON, May 18 — Are three mammoth metal balls rising above the landscape of a national park in Yorkshire a sign that Britain is "in pawn to Uncle Sam?" The Government denies it.

A Labor Member of Parliament indicated today that he thought so, even though the function of the spheres, each 14 feet in diameter, is to help give advance warning of an enemy missile attack. The spheres are to form part of the early-warning station being built on Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire.

G. R. Chetwynd asked the Government to deny that "the erection of these three brass balls was not a visible sign that we were in pawn to Uncle Sam in this part of a national park."

George Ward, Secretary for Air, answered: "I know some Labor members would like to blackball the whole project, but personally I think it is a very useful one."

David with President Eisenhower I almost opened my mouth to make that statement.

I was on the point of making it because the atmosphere there was so convivial with President Eisenhower telling me to call him "My friend" in English and using the same words with regard to myself in Russian. And then, thought I, why not raise the matter with this friend of mine.

His Choice for President

But when I became apprehensive and I thought there was something fishy about this friend of mine and I didn't broach the subject and it turned out that I was right, because when we caught them red-handed they say they are not thieves, it's just their thief-like policy. That is all.

This recalls to my mind what we used to do in the Donbas when I was the young boy. Whenever we caught a cat in the pigeon's loft, we would catch the cat by its tail and bang its head against the wall and that was the only way it could be taught some sense.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM—State, because

by desire of not, you have become a factor in the American political campaign, would you care to say which President you would prefer to deal with?

A.—I thank you for that question. It is a good question, although rather a difficult one to reply to. Nevertheless, I will try to reply.

When I was in the United States, I talked with very many Americans, ordinary people, with people who are wealthy, with representatives of the capitalist world, the statesmen, the farmers. And I retained very good and, I may even say, pleasant memories of my conversations with most of these people.

People everywhere are just like people and they all want peace. Perhaps they understand it in their own way, but that should certainly not be the ground for any conflict. Perhaps they don't agree with my understanding and I don't agree with their belief that the capitalism system is better. But that certainly should not be the object of any conflict and, all the more so, of a war.

I am sure that the majority of Americans regret the act perpetrated by the American Air Force.

It is true there are some Americans who have been kidded into indignation against the acts of the Soviet Union but to this I can but reply, how would they themselves feel if we were to fly our aircraft over their country.

But they would certainly come to the conclusion that such flights are absolutely inadmissible, that this can only end in aggression, can only bring about a war.

Regarding the question of who, in my opinion, will become the United States President, there certainly was a person to my liking, a person with whom I am sure we could have reached agreement.

He was a great American, his name was Roosevelt and he was a worthy representative of the capitalist society, but we cooperated with him very well indeed during World War II. When he died his policy died with him.

But we are convinced that persons will come to power in the United States who will pronounce themselves in

TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT PRESS SECRETARY'S
NEWS CONFERENCE (Cont'd)

vinced that France might not take up a position of appeasement? Why in this case have relations not relaxed despite the intentions and the actions of General de Gaulle? Do you think, nonetheless, that these actions have served the cause of peace?

A.—Naturally we knew of the plane incident, in fact, I reported on it in my speech at the Supreme Soviet. Why then did we come here? Because we thought that perhaps the United States might be stricken by some honesty and apologize for its actions.

All the more so that in the recent past the United States apologized to Cuba when an American plane was shot down over that country.

Then why shouldn't they apologize to the Soviet Union? Well, that is what we thought, evidently we were mistaken. It was evidently one thing to apologize to Cuba and another thing to apologize to a Socialist country.

Well, that is their business. It's simply a matter of upbringing, a matter of manners and honor. Regarding the position taken by General de Gaulle. Yes, he did do all he could but nothing came of his efforts.

Why? Well, I can only refer the correspondent who asked that question to General de Gaulle because it was the general who talked the matter over with President Eisenhower and so he knows his reaction. I don't.

As to the results, well, my opinion is that even after a war when the enemy has been routed the people once again live in peace and friendship.

We had no war. What happened was only that someone tried to poke his nose into our affairs and we punched that nose so that now he certainly knows where the border is. If he comes again, he will receive another blow as will the bases from which he takes off and where he intends to land.

Actually, all this should be digested and the world should once again revert to peace and even more than that to friendship. I am convinced that that is the opinion entertained by President de Gaulle. But he, President de Gaulle, found himself in a very awkward situation. That is my opinion, I don't know, as my

not agree with me. On the one hand, there was nothing he could do but condemn the action because he is a man of lofty moral principles and there can be no two opinions on this matter. This was a thief-like sally.

But on the other hand, the obstacle to this was that the thief turned out to be France's ally and not simply an ally but a leader in Western quarters.

But, I don't want to go into the details of this matter. It concerns the relationships between the allies. But speaking honestly, if it were an ally of ours that had acted in this way, we would say that that was a bad way to act and that the necessary apologies should be tendered.

Well, there you are, those are the moral principles of communism. I cannot answer for the moral principles of a capitalist society. I am a representative of a Socialist society.

I would like to add to that, if I understand the question to have meant how relations between the Soviet Union and France would develop after this, then my opinion is that all this will have no impact on the good relations that exist between France and the Soviet Union and from the talk I had today with General de Gaulle I gained this same impression also, because I feel President de Gaulle also wants to continue a policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

We are certainly in favor of such a policy also, because we hold France in very high esteem as we do President de Gaulle, we esteem the French nation, the French culture, so we certainly hope that our relations with France, far from deteriorating, will improve.

BERLIN RADIO—It follows from American press reports that the American delegate Gates, has from here declared an emergency alarm to the American forces. How do you evaluate that act?

A.—I have heard nothing of that report yet, but I certainly have no reason to disbelieve what the correspondent said.

If this is really so it can be qualified as nothing short of a provocation designed to trick the Americans and impose more taxes on them. Perhaps also it can be explained by ordinary cowardice. Sometimes a coward is even more dangerous than a provocation-monger.

A provocation-monger is trying to provoke war while a coward is a war out of power. I don't know this Gates. It's not for me to judge him. Let the Americans themselves see what sort of a person he is.

The person I can vouch for is Marshal Malinovsky, here, a hero of World Wars I and II, a man who fought valiantly against the German militarists and against Japan during the war, a person who has been often decorated for his outstanding services. There is a true son of a Socialist motherland. And, as he says, he has not been calling any alert nor does he intend to.

Soviet Power Cited

But if this action was designed to somehow prevail upon us, then some other country should be chosen as the target for such acts, because we certainly have every possibility of acting with regard to such provocations in the same way as we used to act with regard to that thieving cat which used to creep into the pigeons' loft. We can certainly teach it a lesson.

[A few minutes were lost here due to a power failure.]

I presume that the United States will attempt to raise the taxes in the country over this incident to try to increase their orders for military equipment—first to take more money from the pockets of the taxpayers and thus to gain greater profits out of armaments production.

Our policy is a completely different one. We have adopted, we have taken, the decision to abolish all taxation of the population by 1965. By that time no one in the Soviet Union will pay any taxes at all.

This year, we are completing the conversion of all the workers of the Soviet Union to a seven-hour working day. By 1964, we will have a six-hour working day for all the workers and employees of the Soviet Union and by that time the coal miner will have but a five-hour working day.

That is our policy, and no provocation will make us turn aside or make us swerve from that correct time that we have chosen. That is the true, the convinced, policy of

the Soviet Union, a Socialist policy, the policy of our Communist party.

TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT AMPUSCHREY'S
NEWS CONFERENCE (Cont'd)

FRANK DEUTSCHLAND,
Chairman of the
German Press Syndicate
asks for the change in the
position of President Eisen-
hower since your talks in
Camp David. Can you explain
the reasons for the difference
in the position of the United
States in Camp David and
now in Paris.

A.—I believe the best reply
to that question was con-
tained in the preceding one,
the one referring to the alarm,
to the emergency alarm—in
the alarm of American troops.

This shows that in the
United States the most reac-
tionary forces in the Pentagon
are coming to the fore, and it
is they who sent their planes
on a sortie into the Soviet
Union, naturally with the
knowledge of the United
States President. And this ex-
plains this piratical policy
pursued by the United States.

JORNAL DO BRASIL:
Three questions. Mr. Chair-
man: Do you intend to go to
pay a visit to the Latin-
American countries in the
near future?

Second, how do you, what is
your appraisal of the Latin-
American countries in the
the present world situation?
and third, can the Latin-
American countries partici-
pate in the solution of out-
standing world problems?

A.—The reply to the first

question, I have just answered.
I am certainly not going to
pay a visit to Brazil. I
have invited me to come.

Latin Visit Possible

But I am not losing hope of
being invited to visit the coun-
tries of Latin America. If I
am I shall gladly avail myself
of that invitation.

As for Latin-America, we
are going to hear the pulse of
the Latin America's struggle for
freedom against Ameri-
can imperialism. The welcome
extended to Nixon in Latin
America countries was cer-
tainly an omen, a signal. And
I can but welcome the events
in Cuba, where the people
proudly and courageously rose
up under the banner for the
struggle for their indepen-
dence. I am convinced that the
other Latin-American coun-
tries will also rise up in the
struggle for their indepen-
dence. We will sympathize
with their struggle and ap-
plaud their successes in this
fight.

I am convinced that the
peoples of Latin America are
accumulating their forces and
that they will play an ever
growing role in international
relations. Unfortunately there
still exist in Latin America
today countries whose govern-
ments are taking money from
their people but are serving
the interests of the American
imperialists. But the Latin
American peoples are awak-
ening, and we welcome this
process and sympathize with
it.

It is only when the Latin
American peoples have their
own governments, govern-
ments that will express the
will of these peoples, that
these nations will be able to
truly raise their independent
voices in the international

arena. And this will cer-
tainly be to the benefit of all
the countries of the world, to
the benefit of the cause of
peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, I
could certainly be ready and
willing to go on with this
press conference longer, but
the interpreters have intimat-
ed that their working day is
over and that I should respect
the labor code. Otherwise
they say, "Chairman—Chair-
man." They say, "You better
end your conference, or else
we will end it without you."

I want to thank the Govern-
ment of France, President de
Gaulle, the entire French peo-
ple and the citizens of Paris.
And not only Paris. For yes-
terday, for example, we paid a
visit to a village outside Paris
that Marshal Malinovsky vis-
ited during World War I,
when he was in the army.

I want to end by saying
that the Soviet Union will
continue to adhere to the
policy of peaceful coexistence
between two systems, the
systems, that we will con-
tinue to pursue a policy of
peace aimed at solving all
questions at issue by negotia-
tions. But at the same time,
we will firmly stand, we will
firmly defend, our sover-
eignty. This policy will, I am
sure, be understood by all the
nations, for this is the only
correct policy, a policy of
defending one's sovereignty
without threats to any one.
Good-by. I want to wish you
all the best.

But at the same time,
I want to voice the hope that
you will work for peace, that
your pen will serve the cause
of peace and friendship
among the nations. Thank
you.

favor of reaching mutually acceptable agreements.

We have nothing to quarrel about with the American people. They are in favor of capitalism, that is their business and even then it is not all the American people who are in favor of capitalism because many of them are simply under the oppression of the capitalistic system.

But let them come, why doesn't everyone come to the Soviet Union and see for themselves what kind of a life we are now leading.

Let even those who have been booing here come. We'll give them visas, too, and perhaps even they will see the light if they come.

Our country is now second in the world in its industrial production, in science and in culture. If I don't perhaps modestly say that we are first in the world, we certainly do occupy a worthy place in human society.

But I do not want to interfere in the American political scene. We should maintain an attitude of patience and not try to forecast who will come to the fore in the United States elections. The American people will themselves elect their worthy representative as President. elect someone who would not understand the necessity of reaching agreement we can wait we have waited and we wait and, if the next President doesn't understand that, we can wait some more. We don't need to hurry, we have long ago chosen the correct path. We have long ago determined the correct line of our development and we are convinced that our choice was made correctly and we are marching confidently ahead to the building of a Communist society.

You, perhaps, in time will also understand that this is the only true road and perhaps you, too, will join this road but even then you will not even be parallel with us, you will be lagging behind and trailing in our wake. But we don't hold that against you, we'll help you to catch up and share our experience with you.

COMBAT, Paris — Mr. Chairman, you agreed to come to France despite the facts of the U-2 incident and knowing of the categorical position taken by America. Were you con-

vinced that France might possibly take up a position of appeasement? Why in this case have relations not relaxed despite the intentions and the actions of General de Gaulle? Do you think, nonetheless, that these actions have served the cause of peace?

A.—Naturally we knew of the plane incident, in fact, I reported on it in my speech at the Supreme Soviet. Why then did we come here? Because we thought that perhaps the United States might be stricken by some honesty and apologize for its actions.

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not agree with me. On the one hand, there was nothing he could do but condemn the action because he is a man of lofty moral principles and there can be no two opinions on this matter. This was a thief-like sally.

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Soviet Power Cited

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Continued on Next Page

These Days

Invitation to Hallinan

By George E. Sokolsky

FOR REASONS of their own, Soviet Russia invited Vincent William Hallinan, a San Francisco lawyer, to attend the trial of Francis G. Powers, the U-2 pilot. Hallinan attended as an observer. He was not asked by the Government of the United States to be an observer.



Sokolsky

For that purpose an embassy is maintained in Moscow. Why then did the Soviet Legal Society ask this particular person?

Hallinan is not the president of the American Bar Association. He is not the dean of a distinguished law school. He is not a judge or even a particularly prominent jurist. So why was he asked?

Well, he is an American Marxist. Powers said that he developed from an intellectual rebel to a Marxist-Leninist. By any definition, a man who so describes himself could be called a Communist by his own admission whether he belongs to the Communist Party or not. One of his clients was Harry Bridges whom he defended in 1949; another was Marion Bachrach, indicted under the Smith Act, in 1956. In 1952, he ran for President under the label of the Independent Progressive Party. If you do not know of this Party, it is way out left. He has been on the board of directors of the Civil Rights Congress and in 1941 was vice president of the National Lawyers Guild.

SO FAR AS the Attorney General's list is concerned, he has supported the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commit-

tee, the California Labor School, the Northern California Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, and the Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case.

So the Russians regard him as a suitable American observer. Out of the thousands of American lawyers, they pick this one to return to this country to say that everything they, the Russians, have done is perfect. Actually, they have had experience with Hallinan. He toured Europe in 1959 and issued a statement from Moscow to the effect that he had visited a Russian jail and that the Russian prison system is far superior to that of the United States.

In this, Hallinan is not altogether without intimate knowledge. In 1952, he served six months in McNeill Island Federal Penitentiary for contempt of court which arose out of the Bridges trial. In 1954-55, he served 18 months for income tax evasion as a result of which he was suspended from practice for three years. He resumed legal practice in March 1960.

THIS THEN is the needle in the haystack that Soviet Russia found to invite to Moscow as the American observer in the Powers Case. If there was to be an American observer, custom and decency require that such an invitation be extended to the Government of the United States. Then the Government could, if it wished to send a lawyer, request the Department of Justice to select a learned jurist, a man of distinction, to attend the trial. The likelihood is that somebody from the embassy would have attended officially. But Soviet Russia picked this lawyer who had once been suspended from practice, who had twice been imprisoned, to represent the United States.

Now, presumably William Hallinan will return to the United States to engage in propagandistic speeches on behalf of Soviet jurisprudence. He will undoubtedly pose as an expert on Soviet law and American espionage and will condemn the Pentagon and the CIA. And there will undoubtedly be women's clubs that will pay a fee to listen to intimate talks on this subject. It is amazing how many so-called Americans have suddenly become experts on Soviet Russia and how many of them travel about the country praising the ways of life of the bitterest foe we have had in our history.

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TEXT OF REPLIES BY KHRUSHCHEV

Continued From Preceding Page

the Soviet Union, a Socialist policy, the policy of our Communist party.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, East Berlin—Mr. Chairman, what in your opinion is the reason for the change in the position of President Eisenhower since your talks in Camp David. Can you explain the reasons for the difference in the position of the United States in Camp David and now in Paris.

A.—I believe the best reply to that question was contained in the preceding one, the one referring to the alarm, to the emergency alarm—in the alarm of American troops.

This shows that in the United States the most reactionary forces in the Pentagon are coming to the fore, and it is they who sent their planes on a sortie into the Soviet Union, naturally with the knowledge of the United States President. And this explains this piratical policy pursued by the United States.

JORNAL DO BRASIL: Three questions. Mr. Chairman: Do you intend to go to pay a visit to the Latin-American countries in the near future?

Second, how do you, what is your appraisal of the Latin-American countries in the the present world situation? and third, can the Latin-American countries participate in the solution of outstanding world problems?

A.—The reply to the first

question is easy regarding any possible intention that I might have of visiting Brazil. Nobody has invited me to come.

Latin Visit Possible

But I am not losing hope of being invited to visit the countries of Latin America. If I am I shall gladly avail myself of that invitation.

As for Latin-America, we are happy to hear the pulse of Latin-America's struggle for independence against American imperialism. The welcome accorded to Nixon in Latin America countries was certainly an omen, a signal. And I can but welcome the events in Cuba, where the people proudly and courageously rose up under the banner for the struggle for their independence. I am convinced that the other Latin-American countries will also rise up in the struggle for their independence. We will sympathize with their struggle and applaud their successes in this fight.

I am convinced that the peoples of Latin America are accumulating their forces and that they will play an ever growing role in international relations. Unfortunately there still exist in Latin America today countries whose governments are taking money from their people but are serving the interests of the American imperialists. But the Latin American peoples are awakening, and we welcome this process and sympathize with it.

It is only when the Latin American peoples have their own governments, governments that will express the will of these peoples, that these nations will be able to truly raise their independent voices in the international

arena, including the United Nations, and this will certainly be to the benefit of all the countries of the world, to the benefit of the cause of peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, I could certainly be ready and willing to go on with this press conference longer, but the interpreters have intimated that their working day is over and that I should respect the labor code. Otherwise they say, "Chairman—Chairman." They say, "You better end your conference, or else we will end it without you."

I want to thank the Government of France, President de Gaulle, the entire French people and the citizens of Paris. And not only Paris. For yesterday, for example, we paid a visit to a village outside Paris that Marshal Malinovsky visited during World War I, when he was in the army.

I want to end by saying that the Soviet Union will continue to adhere to the policy of peaceful coexistence between two systems, the systems, that we will continue to pursue a policy of peace aimed at solving all questions at issue by negotiations. But at the same time, we will firmly stand, we will firmly defend, our sovereignty. This policy will, I am sure, be understood by all the nations, for this is the only correct policy, a policy of defending one's sovereignty without threats to any one. Good-by. I want to wish you all the best.

But at the same time, I want to voice the hope that you will work for peace, that your pen will serve the cause of peace and friendship among the nations. Thank you.

can most efficiently be shared by all," declared President Eisenhower's letter transmitting the report to Congress.

The report declared it has become increasingly clear that the Western industrial nations must make available to the less developed countries the knowledge, advice, and capital to allow economic development within the framework of a free society. The report added:

If they do not do so, the political and economic influence of the Communist system will be firmly established over whole continents, where the fateful first steps of political and economic development are now being taken. . . .

It behooves the Western democracies to demonstrate by their aid and encouragement that economic advancement can be achieved without putting on the straitjacket of political and economic tyranny.

Reporting on mutual security activities during the semiannual period by areas, the report noted these developments:

Europe. Economic aid virtually terminated, with only Spain, Yugoslavia, Iceland, and Berlin left as recipients. On the military side there was a significant increase in defense expenditures of our NATO partners, reflecting increasing economic stability and prosperity of Europe.

Africa. Most pressing needs of new nations of Africa are, first, administrative, managerial, and technical skills, and, second, capital for development projects. A significant development in this area during the period was an increase in Soviet bloc activity, evidenced by acceptance of a \$110 million line of credit by Ethiopia from the bloc and by a \$35 million U.S.S.R. loan to Guinea.

Near East and South Asia. The Near East enjoyed a period of relative calm. A significant development in South Asia was announcement of agreement in principle between India and Pakistan on a plan to divide the waters of the Indus River system.²

Far East. Largest allocations of fiscal year 1960 appropriations were made, as in the past, to the three divided countries—Korea, Viet-Nam, and the Republic of China—which must maintain large defense forces and are consequently in the greatest need of U.S. assistance. Flood relief programs were undertaken in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

Citing other activities of the Mutual Security Program during the period, the report listed De-

² For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1960, p. 442.

velopment Loan Fund loans totaling \$172.2 million in 17 countries. In addition DLF negotiated 22 loan agreements in the amount of \$130 million which represented earlier loan approvals. This activity brought the value of loan commitments issued by DLF since its inception to \$908.8 million. All of the loans made for industrial projects were made to private borrowers, including a chemical and pesticide plant in Turkey, pulp and paper and cement plants in the Philippines, and phosphate mines in Jordan.

A total of \$32 million in special assistance funds was allocated for U.S. participation in the worldwide malaria eradication program.

As a part of the Government's overall plan in this field, the International Cooperation Administration continued to encourage private enterprise to participate more fully in economic development programs in Thailand, the Sudan, Jordan, Israel, India, Taiwan, Nepal, Ceylon, Ghana, and Greece.

The report said the Mutual Security Program played no part in increases in the balance-of-payments deficits of 1958 and 1959, pointing out, while there had been some increases in offshore procurement under nonmilitary programs, these increases were offset by decreases in offshore procurement under military programs. Although MSP did not cause the increase in balance-of-payments deficits, the report pointed to a new DLF procurement policy which could contribute to a reduction in the balance-of-payments deficit. The new DLF policy places primary emphasis on financing of goods and services of U.S. origin in procurement for DLF projects.³

Inter-American Advisory Committee Holds Fourth Meeting

The Department of State announced on May 5 (press release 247) that the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs is meeting at the Department on May 6 and 7. Following his return to Washington Secretary Herter will participate in the meeting of the Committee on May 7.

This will be the fourth meeting of the Committee since its creation by President Eisenhower on November 14, 1959.¹ The purpose of the Commit-

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 708.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 7, 1959, p. 823, and Dec. 21, 1959, p. 904.

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tee is to consider, on a continuing basis, current and long-range problems of our relations with Latin America and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of State. The members of the Committee accompanied President Eisenhower on his trip to South America² earlier this year, and part of the current meeting will be devoted to a review and assessment of the results of that trip.

United States Plane Downed in Soviet Union

Following is a series of statements and the text of a U.S. note on the subject of a U.S. plane alleged to have been shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY HERTER, MAY 9

Press release 254 dated May 9

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia, and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Viet-Nam the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 28, 1960, p. 471.

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's open-skies proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have

not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership, and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This Government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing Members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Statement of May 3¹

A NASA U-2 research airplane, being flown in Turkey on a joint NASA-USAF Air Weather Service mission, apparently went down in the Lake Van, Turkey, area at about 9:00 a.m. (3:00 a.m. e.d.t.) Sunday, May 1.

During the flight in southeast Turkey, the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was experiencing oxygen difficulties. The flight originated in Adana with a mission to obtain data on clear air turbulence.

A search is now underway in the Lake Van area.

The pilot is an employee of Lockheed Aircraft under contract to NASA.

The U-2 program was initiated by NASA in 1956 as a method of making high-altitude weather studies.

Statement of May 5²

One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morning (local time) when

¹ Made orally in response to press inquiries on May 3.

² Released to the press on May 5.

its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.

The airplane had taken off from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The flight plan called for the first check point to be at 37 degrees, 25 minutes, North: 41 degrees, 23 minutes, East, and for a left turn to be made to the Lake Van beacon, thence to the Trabazon beacon, thence to Antalya, and return to Adana. The flight scheduled was estimated at 3 hours, 45 minutes, for a total of 1,400 nautical miles. Takeoff was at 8 a.m. local time.

(The above-given times are the equivalent of 3 a.m. Sunday, and 2 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time.)

About one hour after takeoff, the pilot reported difficulties with his oxygen equipment. Using emergency radio frequency, he reported he was heading for the Lake Van beacon to get his bearings, and that he would return to Adana.

As indicated above, his flight plan called for him to make a left turn at the Lake Van beacon. His last report indicated he was attempting to receive that beacon. It is believed he probably was on a northeasterly course, but there was no further word.

An aerial search was begun soon after receipt of the last communication. The Lake Van area is mountainous and very rugged. No evidence has been sighted of the aircraft having crashed.

If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane from the last reported position would be impossible to determine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would have continued along its north-easterly course.

The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper atmosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, builders of the airplane.

When the research program was begun in 1956 by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (Predecessor to NASA), the federal agency did not have a sufficient number of pilots to operate the program, and so a contract was made with Lockheed to provide the pilots.

Overseas logistic support for NASA's continuing use of the U-2 is provided by Air Weather Service units of the USAF.

NASA has procured a total of 10 U-2 airplanes. The airplane was originally built as a private venture by Lockheed to serve as a "flying test bed". It is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbojet engine, and can maintain flight for as long as four hours at altitudes of up to 55,000 feet.

Since inception of the research program in 1956, the U-2 flying weather laboratories have operated from bases in California, New York, Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.

The U-2 airplanes are presently being used in California (Edwards AFB, one), Japan (Atsugi, three) and Turkey (Adana, four).

The instrumentation carried by the U-2 permits obtaining more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, the jet stream, and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons. The air-

plane also has been used by NASA to obtain information about cosmic rays, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere, including ozone and water vapor.

Instrumentation carried includes: Angular velocity recorder, to measure the airplane's rate of pitch; modified VGH recorder, to measure and record head-on gust components in flight; flight recorder Model BB, continuous recorder of indicated airspeed, pressure altitude and normal acceleration; airspeed and altitude transducer to measure pressure altitude and indicated airspeed; temperature and humidity measuring set AN/AMQ 7, to measure indicated free air temperature and indicated relative humidity; and vortex thermometer system, to measure true free-air temperature within one-half degree Centigrade at high speeds.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 5¹

The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having failure in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 6²

The Embassy of the United States of America by instruction of its Government has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign air-

¹ Read to news correspondents on May 5 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

² Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 6 (press release 249).

craft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a United States plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the United States Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 7³

The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced, it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

It is certainly no secret that, given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries, and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in this field.

The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.

One of the things creating tension in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction.

To reduce mutual suspicion and to give a measure of protection against surprise attack the

³ Read to news correspondents on May 7 by Mr. White.

United States in 1955 offered its open-skies proposal—a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past 4 years.

produce no radioactive fallout. In order to develop sufficient reliable data from the program, it is anticipated that it will be necessary to conduct a series of explosions of various sizes in differing types of geological formations.

Recently the Soviet negotiators at Geneva concurred with the proposal that underground nuclear explosions should be conducted to improve the capability of the proposed control network to detect and identify underground explosions.

They have also indicated a willingness to discuss research and development in the seismic detection area with the United States and the United Kingdom. Agreement has been reached to convene a group of U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S. scientists in Geneva on May 11 to exchange information on the seismic research activities of the three nations as a basis for future determination of the areas in which coordinated or joint research would be most fruitful.

Government agencies including the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Interior, as well as universities and private organizations, will participate in carrying out the United States program of research and development related to the detection and identification of nuclear detonations.

Research Program To Detect, Identify Underground Nuclear Tests Expanded

White House press release dated May 7

The President on May 7 announced approval of a major expansion of the present research and development directed toward an improved capability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. The present U.S. program has evolved from the recommendations set forth by the Panel on Seismic Improvement (Berkner panel).¹ For fiscal year 1960 it has been funded for approximately \$10 million. During fiscal year 1961 it is anticipated that the funds required will be about \$66 million for all aspects of the seismic research and development program.

Known as Project Vela, the program calls for increased basic research in seismology; procurement of instruments for a worldwide seismic research program; development of improved seismic instruments; construction and operation of prototype seismic detection stations; and an experimental program of underground detonations encompassing both high explosive and, where necessary, nuclear explosions. The planned program provides for investigation of all aspects of improvement that are considered to be feasible.

Such nuclear explosions as are essential to a full understanding of both the capabilities of the presently proposed detection system and the potential for improvements in this system would be carried out under fully contained conditions and would

¹For a summary of the conclusions reported by the panel on Mar. 16, 1959, see BULLETIN of July 6, 1959, p. 16.

Documents on Disarmament Talks Made Available for Reference

Press release 233 dated May 2

The Department of State on May 2 made available for reference the verbatims of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee for the period from March 15 to 31, 1960. The release was made pursuant to an agreement reached last month by the 10 negotiating parties that verbatims of the conference sessions will be released on a monthly basis 1 month after the sessions take place. Release of verbatims of subsequent sessions will follow this procedure.

Disarmament: The Problem and the Prospects

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I warmly welcome the opportunity to meet with members of the American Society of International Law, whose signal contributions to scholarship and whose continuing influence on international affairs are recognized throughout the world.

It is a special challenge to address this distinguished group. That is so primarily because your interest and qualifications cover a very wide spectrum, ranging from particular questions of international law and practice to fundamental issues of international peace and order. And it is a high tribute to this organization that this is indeed the case.

Tonight I would like to speak to you about one of these fundamental questions, perhaps the most vital and the most critical of world problems. I refer to the problem of disarmament.

The Urgent Need for Disarmament

The infinitely destructive capabilities of modern warfare have given new focus and urgency to disarmament efforts. I fear that we now take for granted "kilotons" and "megatons" as measures of destructive power. These words, describing nuclear and thermonuclear explosive power in terms of its equivalent in thousands or millions of tons of TNT, have become commonplace. Their impact on the human mind has accordingly tended to diminish. Yet the fact remains that a single plane today can deliver more destructive power than *all* of the planes in *all* of the air forces delivered during the Second World War.

Let us clearly note, moreover, that nuclear weapons technology and capacity may not remain

the exclusive province of those who now possess them. Others can no doubt develop this capability. We thus face clear prospects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the states of the world, with all that this would portend in added hazard to international peace.

I do not need to emphasize here other aspects of the problem of peace and security: the rapid development of missiles, the entry of manmade objects—and soon man himself—into outer space, the advances in chemical and biological methods of warfare. Nor do I need to address myself to the tremendous economic burden of armaments in the world.

Yesterday [April 27] in his press conference, President Eisenhower said that he could "see no reason why the sums which now are going into these sterile, negative mechanisms that we call war munitions shouldn't go into something positive." In this connection it is significant that the amount of money spent for national defense in this world in 1 year would pay for all the activities and programs of the United Nations for the next 500 years. For the totality of this problem is such that the search for disarmament has become a prime imperative of our times.

But we must not be maneuvered into disarmament at any price. The disarmament arrangements we see—and must find—are those that through mutual application and safeguarded implementation will enhance our security and not leave us and our free-world associates open and vulnerable to aggressive action.

Tomorrow, in Geneva, the 10-nation disarmament group, which is the focal point of present disarmament efforts, will recess for 6 weeks until after the meeting at the summit.

¹ Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 28 (press release 226).